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The purpose of this paper is to review the current policy established
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) concerning the use of dis-
counting in evaluating time-distributed costs and benefits of proposed
public investments. Although a widely accepted concept in the private
sector, the use of discounting in the public sector has been less clearly
defined and a subject of considerable debate. The mechanics of discount-
ing and the importance of the discount rate in investment decisions are
discussed. A brief history of discounting in the public sector is pre-
sented including highlights of the Congressional Hearings in 1968 from
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sound investment policy in both private business and government
requires that the decisionmaker know the expected rate of return on the
alternative projects competing for a share of his budget. Investments,
whether public or private, commit resources in the future and carry an
expectation of gains which will materialize over time. It is the ex-
pectation of gains and costs which will be realized only in the future
which pose the crucial problem in investment analysis. Because a dollar
expected a decade from now is not worth as much as a dollar expected
tomorrow, even if general price levels do not change, some procedure must
be employed for placing streams of benefits and costs with different time
patterns on a common basis. The procedure recommended by most for ac-
complishing this common time basis adjustment is known as discounting.
Simply stated, it works by ascertaining how much a dollar held today could
be turned into in future years if invested wisely and then applying this
adjustment to dollars of gains and costs not expected to be received or
incurred until future years.
The applicability of the discounting concept to investment decisions
in the public sector has been less clearly defined than in the private
sector and in the past a subject of considerable debate. The most often
addressed issues centered on whether or not the discount methodology was
applicable to public investment decisions and if so what rate (or range of
rates) would lead to the best decisions. The official policy promulgated
by the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget - 0MB)
in 1969 supported the discounting concept and required a 10% rate be used
throughout the Federal Government.

It might be asked at this point - if the policy has been mandated in
the public sector, is it worth pursuing this issue further? Two reasons
in particular support an affirmative answer to this question. First,
when one considers the budget of the Federal Government, each year crucial
decisions must be made involving billions of dollars to be spent both in
the present and in the future. The sheer magnitude of dollars involved
necessitate that the funds be appropriated to only the most efficient
and effective projects possible. Although the ultimate decisions are
legislated by Congress, the raw data which is submitted during the bud-
get cycle is developed, analyzed and ranked within the context of guidance
from higher authority. It is submitted that a key element in this guid-
ance is the requirement to discount future streams of funds.
A second and related reason for pursuing this matter relates to the
issue of public versus private investment. Projects which are undertaken
in the public sector have an indirect impact on potential investments under
consideration in the private sector. Since the decision to invest in a
public project requires the raising of revenues principally through taxes,
funds become transferred out of the private and into the public sector.
The discount rate employed by the Federal Government is an integral part
of this issue. A low discount rate (e.g. 2%) will result in the approval
of a large number of governmental investment projects. A higher rate
(e.g. 15%), conversely, would filter out many public projects allowing
for greater investment flexibility in the private sector. Baumol sum-
marizes it this way.
At stake in the choice of an acceptable discount rate is
no less than the allocation of resources between the private
and public sectors of the economy. The discount rate, by
indicating what government projects should be undertaken,
can determine the proportion of the economy's activity that
10

is operated by governmental agencies, and hence the
proportion that remains in the hands of private en-
terprise. With so much at issue it is well worth
the effort to explore in some detail the principles
that should be employed in arriving at a discount
figure and the rationale that underlies those prin-
ciples. [1:201]
Within this context, the following chapters will attempt to present
an objective discussion of the important issues pertaining to discounting
in the Federal Government.
11

II. ROLE OF DISCOUNTING
A. WHAT IS DISCOUNTING?
Before undertaking a discussion of the current discounting policy
employed throughout the Federal Government, it is first considered
necessary to define certain key terminology. The concepts introduced





The rate of interest can simply be defined as the per cent of
premium paid on money at one date in terms of money to be on hand one
year later. That is, the rate of interest is the price paid for the
use of money.
2. Compounding
Compounding is the growth in value of funds invested to yield
an income when the income received is not consumed but itself retained
and invested. Interest is computed on the original sum at the end of the
first period. The new and larger principal is then the base for the
interest calculation for the second period and so on. The growing amount
that is found at later times from an investment at the present time is
therefore referred to as the compounded amount. The higher the rate of
interest the increasingly greater the values obtained.
3. Discounting
Discounting is simply the reverse of computing compound interest,
Its use discloses the amount of money which, if invested today at a given
interest rate, would be sufficient to meet future cash payments. Dis-
counting is based on the concept that a dollar not spent today can be
12

invested until needed and that the interest earned on such investments
can then be used to pay part of the future cash requirements. For example,
if the interest rate is 5% per year, then to obtain $1 one year from today
requires that only 95.24 cents be invested today. The 95.24 cents is re-
ferred to as the "present value" of $1 to be received in one year. In
general the present value (PV) of X dollars to be received t years from
now at a simple interest rate of r is obtained by solving the equation
X = PVO+r)*.
B. WHAT IS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RATE?
Tables I through IV show the effect that the choice of interest rate
has on the investments needed now (present values) to accumulate to the
total required for several mutually exclusive options. The differences
arise from the fact that the interest rate chosen determines the return
for any year. When larger returns (from larger interest rates) are al-
lowed to accrue further interest, a relatively small initial investment
can quickly accumulate.
The potential impact of changes in the discount rate on the present
value is seen by considering the equation which gives the present value
of a future disbursement. The discount rate is i, t is the number of
years hence that the disbursement is scheduled, and $ represents the
amount of the disbursement.
The term disbursement in these examples refers to the undiscounted
cash outflows for each of the options while investment denotes the dis-
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Because an inverse relationship exists between the discount rate and the
present value, the rate chosen can have a powerful influence on the analysis
under consideration.
Direct comparisons of the initial investments required for the options
at differing interest rates are given in Table V. For any given option
(except the first) the change in the immediate investment required is dra-
matic. For Option 4, for example, with the low rate of return of 3% for
interim investment opportunities, $117.93 is needed to fulfill the disburse-
ment schedule. As the rate increases, less and less is needed in year 0;
at 20%, only $89.72 is required to fulfill the disbursement schedule.
For this set of alternative disbursement patterns to the problem, then,
the decisionmaker would order his preferences differently (except for the
3% and 5% rates) - and sometimes drastically differently - according to
the interest rate chosen (Table VI).
Figure 1 helds illustrate this phenomenon. The present value of $1 at
any particular number of years hence, changes with the varying interest
rates. The compounding of interest at different rates accounts for this.
Since the interest can have such a profound effect on the ranking of pro-
jects, the nature and determination of the rate is of considerable signifi-
cance.
C. WHY DISCOUNT?
Government decisionmakers long have been concerned with the problem of
how to evaluate appropriately all alternative solutions to a problem. This
question assumes even more importance in view of the fact that, from a
national point of view, the resources available (manpower, money, machines,
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National resources must then be allocated among the various governmental
programs. Each of these programs is (either explicitly or implicitly) as-
signed a priority based on the program's contribution to the nation's goals.
High-priority programs are usually fully funded, while lower-priority pro-
gram funds are eliminated or reduced from the level requested.
Each program's administrator is ultimately responsible for maximizing
his program's contribution to national goals while minimizing drain on
national resources. This is done by determining and recommending the most
cost effective project in attaining a particular goal (solving a particular
problem) which supports the administrator's overall mission. A program
typically consists of a number of such projects. Should one or more of
these supporting projects be less effective than planned, the effectiveness
of the overall program is impaired.
A program that does not contribute sufficiently generally suffers a
decrease in funding. The administrator then must operate with reduced
funds and still maintain his capability to achieve his objectives as ef-
fectively and efficiently as possible. Before seeking funding, then an
important input to the administrator is the evaluation of competing pro-
jects from the point of view of each project's impact on the economy, the
private sector (taxpaying individuals and organizations, from which the
funding is obtained), mission effectiveness, and efficient use of funds.
The discounting (or present value analysis) procedure required by Office
of Management and Budget Circular A-94 is intended, in theory, to provide
the government decisionmaker with an additional analytical tool to evaluate
competing projects. Discounting allows the decisionmaker to make direct
comparisons using the single criterion of present dollars.
21

III. SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE
In order to better understand the current policy, it is worthwhile to
review the history of discounting particularly as it pertains to the public
sector. The question of establishing a "social" discount rate (i.e. a
discount rate which is applicable to the public sector) has been among the
most discussed and most controversial issues in the entire area of public
expenditure economics. During the period from the late 1950s to the late
1960s there was considerable debate on exactly how to determine the social
discount rate. Two general social discount rate positions, the opportunity
cost of capital and the social time preference, were the most often presented,
A. SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE THEORIES
1 . The Social Time Preference Position [2]
The argument for a social time preference public discount rate is
premised on the proposition that provision for the future is a commodity
with public characteristics. This proposition assumes the privately experi-
enced gains and costs on which citizens form their savings-consumption-
borrowing-investing decisions fail to reflect the social gains and costs
which accrue from such investment. Because private decisions neglect pro-
viding for future generations, the level of private investment is suboptimal
.
Simply stated, there is too much emphasis on present consumption at the
expense of investment.
Although a number of corrective remedies are available, the social
time preference position argues that the public sector should increase its
own investment by adopting a discount rate which is below observed private
sector rates, a discount rate which reflects the social desire (somehow
ascertained) to provide for the future.
22

2. The Opportunity Cost Position
The opportunity cost position argues that the government in its
role as an investor should attempt to maximize the well-being of the nation
as this is reflected in the national income. It proposes that no public
investment be undertaken which produces outputs of less value than that of
the alternative use of the resources which it absorbs. The social return
on public investments must at least equal that experienced on the spending
displaced in the private sector.
In bestowing normative significance on the private sector behavior,
this position completely avoids the question of whether the society is
undertaking enough provision for the future. It does so by recognizing
that the function of the discount rate in public sector investment analysis
is to reflect accurately the private opportunities forgone in each of a
number of alternative investments and not to serve as a vehicle by which to
alter the society's rate of capital formation. It leaves that task to other
social instruments such as investment tax credits. This basic position
has a number of variations from which result disagreement over what really
gets displaced when government invests. Several are briefly discussed in
the following paragraphs.
One position argues that private sector activity is displaced and
its returns forgone when public investments divert real inputs from the
private to the public sector [3]. Because such factor displacement im-
plies a reduction in the output of both consumption and investment goods,
the sacrifices implied must be reflected in the social discount rate. How-
ever, because the value of the consumer sacrifices is automatically reflected
in the profits of business firms through the prices at which goods exchange,
one has only to observe the before-tax rates of returns in private business.
23

In averaging these rates so as to generate an empiric estimate of the
social discount factor, the breakdown of U. S. business investment between
corporate and noncorporate business is suggested as a guide.
In a second view, costs which are imposed on the private sector
when the Federal Government finances its expenditures through borrowing
are considered [4]. These costs are caused by the private credit restric-
tion and the additional saving which results from capital market adjustment
processes to accommodate the new public demand. Hence it is the real cost
of borrowed funds which has normative significance and this real cost is
indicated by the rates of return (including a return to cover taxes) on
the corporate and noncorporate investment and the residential construction
which gets eliminated by the additional government borrowing and by the
rates on the additional savings which are generated. To implement this
conceptual position empirically, the analyst must trace the restrictive
effect of government borrowing on the various sectors of the capital mar-
ket, estimate the real value of capital investment and saving in each of
these sectors and finally calculate the weighted average value of private
capital and consumption displacements caused by public borrowings as weights
The basic difference between these two concepts lies in the vehicle
through which costs are imposed on the private sector. In the latter, the
vehicle is the public borrowing that tightens capital markets and restricts
credit to other sectors and in the former, the vehicle is the extraction
of real inputs,
A third opportunity cost position looks to yet another set of pri-
vate sector impacts for guidance in social discount rate estimation. This
position argues that federal expenditures are paid for by the taxes through
which they are financed [5]. Hence it is the private spending displaced
24

by these taxes which represents the opportunity cost of public expenditure.
Because the incidence of federal taxes falls on both consumers and businesses,
both consumption spending and investment spending get displaced. The pri-
vate sector interest rates relating to both household saving-borrowing-
consuming decisions (private time preference) and business investment-
borrowing decisions (rates of return before taxes) must be reflected in the
social opportunity cost rate of discount. Empirical estimation of this
rate requires that the relevant federal taxes be traced to their sources
in the various subsectors of the household and business sectors and then
be weighted by the relative amounts of spending displaced in each by the
imposition of those taxes. The social discount rate then appears as the
weighted rate of return or private sector spending displaced through the
taxes implicit in the public investment expenditure.
B. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS
In 1968 the U. S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on
Economics in Government undertook a detailed review of the issue of deter-
mining a social discount rate to be used throughout the Federal Government.
A study by the General Accounting Office (GAO) presented during these
hearings illustrated the urgent need for such action. This report, which
summarized the use of discounting used by various federal agencies, revealed:
1. Ten of 23 agencies used discounting in evaluating their fiscal
year 1969 programs.
2. Eight did not use discounting in fiscal year 1969 decisions, but
planned to use it in the future.
3. Five of the agencies did not use discounting and stated that they
had no intentions of using it.
4. The discount rates used by the ten agencies who employed discounting
varied from 2% to 12% and a variety of rationales were used to sup-
port the different rates. For example, the Office of Economic
Opportunity used rates of three and five per cent to evaluate the Job
25

Corps and Upward Bound programs and five per cent to evaluate
the family planning program. The rationale for selecting these
rates was that they were safely on the conservative side for
estimates of this type and gave consideration of the secular
growth in the price of quality-constant labor [6:5].
It was obvious from this and other reports that the federal agencies
applied discounting at their discretion. Furthermore, there apparently was
no unique rationale for determining the appropriate interest rate. A com-
mon understanding concerning the use of discounting did not exist in the
Federal Government. During a series of hearings held by the Joint Economic
Committee, witnesses from various agencies and economic advisors were called
upon to analyze the situation and offer solutions and improvements. The
Committee as a result of these hearings concluded that consistent discount-
ing procedures and appropriate interest rate policy must be adopted through-
out the Federal Government if wise and economic investment decisions are to
be made. The Committee recommended in part:
1. The Bureau of the Budget (now 0MB) insist on the adoption of
consistent discounting procedures by all agencies;
2. The Bureau of the Budget, in conjunction with an appropriate
Government agency, immediately undertake a study to develop
a method of estimating the weighted average opportunity cost
of private spending displaced by government investment. This
method should recognize that the financing of the Federal
Government entails a reduction in both private consumption and
private investment spending;
3. An appropriate Federal agency undertake an ongoing publication
of this weighted-average opportunity cost interest rate as
guidance to those agencies applying discount analysis to public
investment decisions. The interest rate calculation and publi-
cation should be pursuant to and based upon the above-mentioned
study [7:1].
0MB Circular A-94 dated 27 March 1972 to the Heads of Executive Depart-
ments and Establishments provides such a standard discount rate to be used
in evaluating costs and/or benefits of Government decisions concerning the
initiation, renewal or expansion of programs and projects. The discount
rate is suggested for use in internal planning of agencies but is required
26

for program analysis submitted to 0MB in support of legislative and budget
programs. The 10% rate was selected because it " . . . represents an esti-
mate of the average rate of return on private investment before taxes and
after inflation" [8:4].
C. DERIVATION OF THE RATE
The 10% rate established was based primarily on a study done by Stock-
fisch for the Institute for Defense Analyses. In order to understand better
the basis for the current rate and to gain an appreciation of some of the
assumptions which were made in its derivation, Stockfisch's methodology is
summarized below.
Stockfisch took the position that the rate-of-return, or cost of capital
measure, employed in the evaluation or costing of government programs should
equal the before-tax rate of return generated by private investment. The
basic approach of his analysis was to develop a methodology for measuring
the opportunity cost of private investment and to present quantitative
estimates based on the application of that methodology.
In this regard, Stockfisch used what he referred to as an "earning
assets approach" in computing the rate of return for the industries exam-
ined. Earning assets consisted of accounts receivable, inventory, plant
and equipment less accumulated depreciation and land. Excluded were cash
and equity and debt claims.
Table VII summarizes the rate of return behavior for selected corporate
sectors. It appears that Stockfisch computed the rates of return for the
period 1949-1965, but used only 1961-1965 as the base for the derivation of
the discount rate. Although the data suggests that a number of distinct
margins of investment existed in the economy, Stockfisch estimated the rate
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The second part of Stockfi sen's derivation process was based upon the
allocation of business investment spending. Table VIII shows the alloca-
tion of business investment on plant and equipment by year during the five
year period of 1961 through 1965. Stockfisch hypothesized that the rate
of return in the manufacturing sector would also apply to the mining and
commercial sectors on the grounds that competition within the unregulated
sector would tend to promote equality in the rates of return. Accordingly,
he weighted the manufacturing rate of return of 15% at 70% (the approxi-
mate portion the unregulated sector accounted for in investment spending)
and the 10* rate for regulated utilities at 30%. Thus he estimated the
overall rate of return in the corporate sector, before property taxes, at
13.5%. To this he added an estimate of the effective property tax rate
at 1.5% and concluded that the pre-tax rate of return in the corporate
sector was "15%.
Acknowledging that a large amount of investment, including housing and
agriculture, occurs in the noncorporate sector, Stockfisch, using Goldsmith's
wealth estimates (Table IX), estimated the relative importance of the non-
corporate and corporate sectors at 60% and 40% respectively. In order to
identify the returns in the noncorporate sector, he made the assumption
that returns in the corporate sector, after corporate taxes, equalize
through competition. To estimate the corporate tax figure, Stockfisch
reasoned that if corporate tax is viewed as an "ad valorem" tax, a rough
estimate could be obtained by dividing corporate taxes by corporate assets.
Using this approach, he computed an ad valorem tax rate of 4.7%. By sub-
tracting this rate from the 15% corporate rate of return, he estimated the
return in the noncorporate sector, before property taxes, to be slightly
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TABLE IX. PRIVATE PHYSICAL ASSET HOLDINGS,












a. Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith, Robert E. Lipsey and Morris Mendel son,
Studies in the Balance Sheet of the United States , Vol. 99, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963. Table 1
, pp. 68-69.








noncorporate return at the 40 and 60 ratio previously noted and derived an
overall estimate of 12% as the rate of return, before corporate and property
taxes, for investment in the entire private sector.
His final calculation was an adjustment for inflation to counter the po-
tential argument that the estimated rate of returns based on historical ac-
counting data and the methodology he employed were too high because of
increases in the general price level. The reason such estimates might be
biased upward was because the accounting book values of assets for any
given year (which constituted the denominator in the rate of return ratio)
represented assets which were mostly acquired over past years when acquisition
prices were lower. The value of the asset base was therefore too low and
the calculated rate of return too high. Stockfisch computed the annual
2
rate of increase in the personal consumption expenditure deflator to be
1.6%, which he subtracted from the 12% rate. He therefore concluded the
real opportunity rate of return to be approximately 10%.
In a recent attempt to determine whether or not Stockfisch 1 s rate re-
mains valid, Stampler replicated Stockfisch 1 s methodology using updated
data. As a result of this effort, Stampler concluded that,
"Stockfisch 1 s estimate of an unadjusted-for-inflation 12% rate
of return for the private sector appears to retain substantial
validity today in spite of economic traumas and upheavals ex-
perienced subsequent to its development" [10:22].
2
The personal consumption expenditure deflator is one of the three
major price indices which combined comprise what is commonly referred to
as the GNP deflator. The other two indices, gross domestic investment
and government spending, were not included since they are mainly indices





As was noted in Chapter III, the decade preceding the congressional
hearings of 1968 was marked by considerable controversy concerning the
establishment of a social discount rate. Since the promulgation of 0MB
Circular A-94, the level of discussion, if not necessarily the level of
controversy, has increased significantly. This fact notwithstanding,
several issues are deserving of review.
The first of these issues is concerned with the question of infaltion
and its impact on discounting. This is a subject which has generated
increasing attention in the private sector in recent years but virtually
none in the public sector. It is a particularly timely and important
issue and, therefore, is considered in detail. The remainder of the
chapter summarizes several issues which either highlight what have been
cited as weaknesses in the current policy or question the basic rationale
upon which it is based.
A. INFLATION
Inflation is feared by all, criticized by most, and clearly understood
by few. Infaltion is currently considered by the public as the number
one domestic and economic problem in the United States. But what is in-
flation? Inflation is a rising trend in the general level of prices.
This does not mean, of course, that all prices &re necessarily rising.
Even during periods of acute inflation some specific prices may be rela-
tively constant and others may be actually falling. Nor does inflation
mean that prices rise evenly or proportionally. Indeed, one of the
difficulties of infaltion lies in the fact that prices tend to rise
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unevenly. Some vault upward; others rise at a more leisurely pace;
others do not rise at all.
There are two general theories which attempt to explain the causes of
inflation. The first is what is often referred to as "demand-pull" in-
flation. This situation occurs when there is more money in the hands of
consumers than there are goods and services to satisfy demand. Prices
are "pulled" up as consumer's demand exceeds the supply available. The
second theory is what has become known as "cost-push" inflation. Cost-
push inflation is usually attributable to monopolistic market power --
the effective degree of discretion which those who control resources,
such as unions or firms, have to set wages and prices.
Whatever the underlying reasons for its existence, the impact of in-
flation is widespread and can affect investment decisions of individuals,
private businesses and government. The intent of this section is not to
discuss the subject of inflation in detail but rather to explore its im-
pact within the context of the issue of discounting in the Federal Govern-
ment. With this in mind, two aspects of inflation as it pertains to the
current discounting policy are considered. The first reviews the effect
of recent inflation rates as applied to Stockfisch's computations while
the second section discusses alternative methods for incorporating antici-
pated inflation into projected cash flows of potential investments.
1 . Stockfisch's Adjustment for Inflation
Since Stockfisch explicitly adjusted for inflation in his computa-
tions, his methodology deserves reconsidering. As previously noted, when
Stockfisch's procedure was replicated, his unadjusted-for-inflation rate
of return of ]2% remained basically unchanged. When, however, adjustments
for inflation were made using more recent data, the inflation adjusted cost
of capital was substantially altered. The following points are worth
considering.

The first concerns an error in Stockfisch's method of computing
the average rate of inflation for the period 1949-1965. In deriving the
average annual rate increase in the personal expenditure deflator, Stock-
fisch simply subtracted the 1949 index (81.7) from the 1965 index (108.9)
and divided by 16 years. Since the absolute difference of these years
would vary depending on the base year chosen, Stockfisch should have de-
rived his average annual rate of inflation by computing the relative
change during the period. However, because inflation was not a particular
problem during this period, a recomputation of this rate (1.8%) produces
no significant change in the original figure.
Of considerably more significance is the effect on the infaltion
adjusted discount rate when more recent deflators are included in Stock-
fisch's computations. Table X includes average annual percentage increases
in the personal consumption expenditure deflator for various arbitrary
periods. As in Stockfisch's methodology, an inflation adjusted rate is
obtained by subtracting the computed deflators from his 12% base.
TABLE X. INFLATION ADJUSTED DISCOUNT RATES
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INFLATION ADJUSTED
INCREASE IN PERSONAL CON- DISCOUNT RATE







It is interesting to note that the higher rates of inflation in re-
cent years have the effect of lowering the adjusted discount rate. Lower
rates imply that in general more government projects would be considered









2. Incorporating Anticipated Inflation Into Cash Flows
Regardless of whether alternative investment projects are being
evaluated in the private or public sectors, certain basic elements remain
unchanged. Among the first steps is to develop a projection of the amounts
of cash flows, both in and out, related to the alternatives together with
the time dimension of each flow. Five quantities must be estimated:
a. The amount of the initial capital outlay and any later investment.
b. The amount of cash (if any) that will be available at the end
of its productive life.
c. The net increase in cash flows (if any) expected from the in-
vestment.
d. The times when the above outflows and inflows are expected to
occur.
e. The expected productive life of the investment.
Considering these points, the question arises - should or should
not anticipated inflation be introduced into investment analysis? Before
exploring this question, the difference between real and money cash flows
needs considering.
Cash flow data for capital budgeting analysis can take two forms:
money cash flows (MF) and real cash flows (RF). Cash flows in money terms
for an investment proposal can be given by a series of terms (MF,., MFn •
,
. . ., MF, . . . . MFy
.
) where MF. • represents the net cash flow expected
from the jth investment in period t expressed in terms of money prices
for period t without any adjustment for changes over time in the general
level of prices. Money cash flows are equivalent to current dollar cash
flows.
Real cash flows are derived from money cash flows by a transforma-
tion involving some price index. In general, a money flow in period to can
be adjusted to the real terms of period t by dividing the money flow by
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the price index formed by the ratio of the index for t« to the index for
tp A money flow of $242 in period t« when the index is 121 is equivalent
to the real flow of $200 in period t, when the index is 100. That is,
$200 = $242/(121/100). Real cash flows are equivalent to constant dollar
cash flows.
The question of how to handle inflation in cash flow estimation
can be now considered. In the public sector the policy is quite clear.
0MB Circular A-94 specifies,
All estimates of costs and benefits for each year of the planning
period should be made in constant dol lars. ... Estimates may re-
flect changes in the relative prices of costs and/or benefit
components, where there is reasonable basis for estimating such
changes, but should not include any forecasted change in the
general price level during the planning period [8:3].
Some agencies, such as the Department of the Defense, acknowledge
that inflation is often an important consideration in conducting time-
phased trade-off studies. When this situation exists, analyses are required
to consider inflation although such anlayses are considered supplemental
to that conducted using constant dollars. Three methods are suggested for
calculating project costs adjusted for anticipated inflation [11:10].
a. Inflate the cost streams first then introduce the discount rate.
b. Discount the cost streams first, then introduce inflation.
c. Apply a joint discount/inflation rate in a single calculation.
Regardless of which of these methods is employed, the adjusted net present
values in all three calculations will be the same.
There has been a growing interest in the private sector concerning
inflation and its impact on investment decisions with particular attention
focused on new and innovative ways of dealing with this problem. The under-
lying belief exists that, "Significant increases in the general price level
of goods and services necessitate modification of traditional capital bud-
geting procedures to avoid inefficient allocation of capital" [12:18].
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Using the definitions of real and money cash flows introduced earlier,
the following paragraphs explore one alternative means of incorporating ex-
plicit provisions for general price level changes into the traditional
discounting (net present value analysis) method. A constant rate of gen-
eral price level change, p, is used for simplicity although this is not a
necessary constraint [12].
For a given discount rate, i, the discounted value of the jth pro-
ject can be expressed in the following form:
T
t
MV = I MF../(l+i) r
J t=1
tj
where MV . is the discounted value based on unadjusted cash flow.
If price changes at a constant rate p per year, then the trans-




= MF../0+p) . Thus RF . is the money flow of period t adjusted to
the price level of period t-. . For example, when the price level is rising
at a rate of 10% per period, a money flow of $242 two periods hence is
equivalent to a real flow of $200 in current dollars, i.e. $200=5242/(1 .0+.1 ) .
The adjusted discount value, RV
•













The adjustment of the money flows for the general price level
change at the constant rate p can be thought of as an adjustment to the
discount rate, i, which is then used to compute the discount value based
on money flows. For ewery product (l+p)'(l+i), where p and i are known,
an adjusted discount rate, a, can be calculated such that (l+a)=(l+p)*(l+i).
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More specifically a = (1+p) + (i*p). For example, if p = .05 and i = .10,
then RV . can be obtained from the equation MV . merely by substituting the
adjusted rate, a = (.05+. 10) + (.05)(.10) = .155, for the discount rate i.
Clearly the real discounted value, RV . will differ from the money discounted
value, MV-. Table XI provides a sample of adjusted factors derived utilizing
the described methodology.
TABLE XI
ADJUSTED DISCOUNT FACTORS FOR SELECTED UNADJUSTED DISCOUNT
RATES (i) AND RATES OF GENERAL PRICE LEVEL CHANGE (p)
UNADJUSTED RATES OF GENERAL PRICE LEVEL CHANGE (p)
RATE (i) .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
.00 .000 .010 .020 .030 .040 .050
.04 .040 .050 .031 .071 .082 .092
.08 .080 .091 .102 .112 .123 .134
.10 .100 .111 .122 .133 .144 .155
.12 .120 .131 .142 .154 .165 .176
.16 .160 .172 .183 .195 .206 .218
.20 .200 .212 .224 .236 .248 .260
Can the introduction of an adjusted discount rate change the
ranking of investments? The answer may best be shown through an example.
Tables XII and XIII contain data on two hypothetical investment projects.
When the unadjusted discount rate equals 10%, project 1 yields the higher
present value. If, however, a 5% increase in the general price level is
anticipated and incorporated into the discount rate as proposed, an adjusted
rate of 15.5% results. As can be seen by comparing the last column in
Tables XII and XIII at the discount rate of 15.5%, project 2 yields the
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Although the ranking changed in this example, this will not always
be the case. As can be seen, at a rate of 13% the two projects have ap-
proximately the same present value. Thirteen percent represents what
Fisher referred to as the "... rate of return over cost" [13:155]. That
is the rate of interest which when used in calculating the present worth
of two options, equalizes them. In the previous example, if the adjusted
discount rate had been less than 13%, project 1 would have continued to
yield the higher net present value.
B. ECONOMIC VERSUS SOCIAL GOALS
Not all of the members of the Joint Economic Committee of 1968 agreed
with the Committee's conclusions. The basic point of departure of the
dissenting members was the acceptance of the business-oriented criteria
for evaluating government activity. In a separate statement the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, Representative W, Patman, asked,
Do we mean to say that we believe society will benefit more from
a new gadget than from the construction of a new school or
sewage system because the immediate financial return on the
former might be 6.5 per cent as opposed to 5 per cent on the latter?
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Our society has many objectives which could never be shown on a
profit and loss statement and our government has obligations
to its citizens which cannot be dismissed by reference to a
profit maximizing rate of return [7:22,23].
In a similar vein Committee member Senator J. Sparkman concluded:
Unquestionably the many demands of the people upon their Government
for facilities and services make it necessary that Government
establish priorities for the investment of public funds. This is
true because private investment seeks only economic efficiency,
whereas public investment seeks objectives which are a mix of economic
and social goals [7:24].
Those who concur with such statements would argue that whether or not
the total benefits of a public investment warrant its undertaking is largely
a social and political question, not a strictly economic one. Both the
benefits and costs of many public investments are multidimensional and are
inappropriate subjects for straightforward evaluation in terms of present
values of economic prices.
C. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
In making investment decisions, eyery organization must try to satisfy
one of two broad guidelines:
1. minimize costs subject to some level of effectiveness; or
2. maximize effectiveness subject to fiscal constraints.
No organization can do both simultaneously. In a recent article, Com-
mander Rolf Clark uses this concept as a basis for rejecting the use of
the discounting methodology in situations where the decisionmaker is re-
quired to maximize effectiveness subject to budgetary constraints [14].
Commander Clark provides a simple intuitive example as a means of sup-
porting his hypothesis. In his example it is assumed that the decision-
maker's budget for the next year is $100 which cannot be exceeded. If the
next year's costs are assumed to be $101, discounting the $101 will diminish
its present value, but will not keep the cost within the $100 budget. In
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such a situation, Commander Clark reasons that if next year's costs are
to be discounted, then the budget should be also. But if both budget and
costs are discounted, the discounting process is in effect neutralized.
The decisionmaker in the public sector thus is faced with conflicting
guidance. On one hand he is required to discount costs alone while on the
other hand he is required to remain within fiscal guidance limits. Comman-
der Clark's point is that the discounting and fiscal guidance policies are
compatible only if both costs and budgets are discounted at the same rate, a
situation which, as previously noted, would nullify the effect of discounting.
D. ARTIFICIAL GAINS
Another argument presented in the same article points out the fact that
discounting can be intentionally (or unintentionally) misused resulting in
possible incorrect decisions. If, for example, an organization desires to
make a particular program more attractive to the decisionmaker, certain program
costs could be deferred and thus discounted by a greater factor. That is, the
net present value of an investment can be significantly reduced by rearranging
and stretching out costs. Table XIV illustrates how the rearrangement of out-
lays can reduce the net present value of one program as compared with another














1 $ 50 $ 45.45 $300 $272.70
2 5 4.13 5 4.13
3 5 3.76 5 3.76
4 5 3.42 5 3.42
5 300 186.30 50 31.05
Total 5365 $243.06 $365 $315.06
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It is for this reason Commander Clark concludes, "... when program
cost comparisons are made in constant (undiscounted dollars) such artifi-
cial gains will be less effective"[14:17].
The counter argument is that costs should be deferred as much as pos-
sible unless the penalty for such action is greater than the return rate.
If in the example cited it is assumed that either alternative will satis-
factorily attain the desired objective, then Project A would be preferable
and would result in the more efficient use of resources.
E. DEFERRED COSTS
It can also be argued that when programs are selected that have the
lowest net present value because costs are deferred (either intentionally
or not), future generations are forced to pay for decisions made in the
present. If one considers a hypothetical problem of trying to decide
between two equally effective alternatives this point becomes clear.
Let it be assumed that the first alternative (Project A) involves pur-
chasing highly sophisticated equipment which requires minimal labor to
operate and maintain. The second alternative (Project B), which has the
lower net present value, is labor intensive and requires virtually no
equipment. Graphically the cash flow profiles might look as follows:
Figure 3




In choosing alternative A, the majority of the costs will be absorbed
by those making the decision to proceed with the project. Selection of
Alternative B, however, commits those in more distant years to pay costs
(e.g. retirement expenses) for which they had little or no input.
Such logic may be countered by pointing out the fact that if the proper
social discount rate were used and Project B found preferable to Project A,
then society would have more cash to invest in the project in the future
than the difference between B and A. As noted in Chapter II, a dollar
not spent today can be invested until needed and the interest earned as




Although the concept of discounting is relatively straightforward and
has gained wide acceptance in the private sector, its application in the
Federal Government has been less clearly defined. The controversy over
discounting in the public sector, which transpired for many years, cul-
minated in 1968 when the Joint Economic Committee on Economy in Government
undertook the task of exploring the issue in depth. During these hearings,
leading economists and government officials who testified were virtually
unanimous in agreement that the discounting of future funds flow in
public investment analysis was appropriate.
Nevertheless, as was seen in the previous chapter, the concept of dis-
counting is not without its flaws and detractors. For example, Commander
Clark has argued that budget constraints cause discounting to become an
irrelevant requirement in the decision process. Such reasoning, however,
should not be employed to conclude discounting is without value. It is
equally true that while at each level the aggregate undiscounted dollar
cost of the alternatives chosen must remain within the undiscounted dollar
constraint placed upon the manager at that level, discounting may still
prove useful for choosing among alternatives and providing information to
the next decision level.
In a similar vein, the issues of artificial gains through cash flow
manipulations and the impact of deferred costs on future generations,
although thought provoking, do not provide a convincing argument against
the validity and usefulness of the discounting concept. As with any
system or procedure, the potential for misuse or misapplication exists.
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Discounting of itself does not cause a decision to be good or bad. It
is the responsibility of the decisionmaker to be aware of such factors
and to incorporate them into the decision process.
Of all the potential issues which are relevant to the current discount-
ing policy, inflation is considered to present the greatest challenges. In
reviewing the derivation of the 10% rate, it was observed that when more
recent inflation rates were introduced into Stockfisch's computations,
his adjusted rate ranged between 10.2% and 5.5%. In other words, depending
on the period chosen, significantly different rates would result. The high
inflation rates of the 1970s and the resultant effect on Stockfisch's ad-
justed rate, imply that the cost of capital is relatively cheap and that
more projects are economically justifiable.
Of equal importance is the question of whether or not anticipated in-
flation rates should be incorporated into projected cash flows of proposed
public projects. One such method was discussed and was shown to have poten-
tial implications on the ranking of alternative projects. The obvious and
certainly the most difficult aspect of such an approach or any similar ap-
proach would be in determining accurate projections for general price level
increases. Although many indices are available to report what has happened
in the past, no model presently exists which can be relied upon with any
degree of confidence for making projections into the future.
In summary, it is concluded that the general policy requiring the use
of discounting in the public sector is appropriate. Whether the social
time preference theory or a variation of the opportunity cost theory gives
the best approximation of the social discount rate is a question that has
no "correct" answer. The selection by the Joint Economic Committee of the
opportunity cost of displaced private spending as the basic criterion for
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determining the social discount rate is considered reasonable and as
defensible as any of the alternatives.
What does appear to be significantly less defensible is the 10%
rate. The problems associated with infaltion raise serious questions con-
cerning the validity of this rate both in its derivation and its appli-
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